This paper focuses on Byzantine attack detection for Gaussian two-hop one-way relay network, where an amplify-and-forward relay may perform Byzantine attacks by forwarding altered symbols to the destination. For facilitating attack detection, we utilize the openness of wireless medium to make the destination observe some secured signals that are not attacked. Then, a detection scheme is developed for the destination by using its secured observations to statistic check other observations from the relay. On the other hand, notice the Gaussian channel is continuous, which allows the possible Byzantine attacks to be conducted within continuous alphabet. The exiting work on discrete channel may not be available for investigating the detectability of the proposed scheme. The main contribution of this paper is to prove that if and only if the wireless relay network satisfies a non-manipulable channel condition, the proposed detection schemes can detect arbitrary attacks that allows the stochastic distributions of altered symbols to vary arbitrarily and depend on each other. No pre-shared secret or secret transmission is needed for the detection.
, [4] , while requiring the cryptographic keys, to which the relays are not privy, to be shared between the source and destination before the communication takes place. Without using cryptography keys, information theoretic detection schemes are proposed for multicast system or Caterpillar Network [5] , [6] . These schemes are able to achieve errorless performance in probability, yet assuming that at least one relay or link is absolutely trustworthy.
Besides these schemes treating channels as noiseless bit-pipes, there are also many other attack detection schemes designed according to specific characteristics of physical-layer channel for varying application scenarios. These schemes are mainly enabled by utilizing tracing symbols, or self-information provided by network topology structure. In particular, source node inserts tracing symbols into a sequence of information bits, and then sends them together to the destination. Relying on the priori knowledge of tracing symbols, the destination could detect attacks by comparing its observed tracing symbols and the ground truth of tracing symbols. This tracing-based method is applicable with perfect CSI [7] , [8] or no need of CSI [9] , [10] for varying network scenarios. The tracing-symbol based schemes commonly assume that the value and insertion location of the tracing symbols are known only at the source and the destination, which indeed requires a additional tracing-symbol distribution mechanism implemented between communication parties. Besides that, these schemes assume that each malicious relay garbles its received symbols according to independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) stochastic distributions. This model of i.i.d. attacks may not always be valid in practice, although it makes analysis simple. The Byzantine attack detection methods presented in [7] [8] [9] [10] may no longer be provably unbreakable for non-i.i.d. attacks.
Notice that all the above-mentioned schemes detect attacks by inserting redundancy so as to increase the overhead cost.
In contrast, the schemes, utilizing side information (SI) provided by network topology structure, do not need to insert any redundancy or just insert negligible redundancy. Generally, upon the network topology structure, most of these schemes are able to gain secured SI, that it is absolutely not attacked and statistically correlated to the observations from the relay. Then, the SI can be used to check the signals observed from the potential malicious relay. For instance, in [11] , [12] , the considered wireless setup or employed ARQ protocol allow source node to overhear information from the relay, it gives the source a opportunity to utilize its transmitted signals as secured SI to detect attacks based on the correlation between its overheard signals from the relay and its transmitted signals. In [13] , [14] , for the detection implemented in the destination of wireless one-way network, the direct link between source and destination provides secured SI to the destination. The attacks are detectable by comparing the observations from the direct link and from the relay link. Moreover, for denoising, perfect error correction codes (ECCs) are assumed to be used in the two links, such that the destination has opportunity to observe the exact information that are transmitted by the source or the relay. The detection performance of [11] [12] [13] [14] are impacted by channel fading, especially, the performance of [13] and [14] depends on the the quality of direct link, such that it may not work well in the network where direct link does not exist or suffers deep fading.
On the contrary, [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] could detect attacks with arbitrary small error probability. In particular, [15] [16] [17] [18] consider two-way relaying (TWR) protocol for the typical three-node network, where communication parties could use its transmitted signals as secured SI to detect arbitrary attacks. To elaborate a little further, in [15] , communication parties are required to simultaneously transmit signal to relay with the same power constraint, then each node's own lattice-coded transmitted symbols are employed to simultaneously support secret transmission and construct an algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) code to detect arbitrary Byzantine attacks in TWR networks with Gaussian channels. This scheme is difficult to extend this scheme to non-Gaussian channels. In our previous work [16] [17] [18] , focusing on two-way relay system, we show that for discrete memoryless channels (DMCs), it is possible to detect potential Byzantine attacks dispensing any AMD code or cryptographic keys. The basic idea is that each node utilizes its own transmitted symbols as secured SI for statistically checking against the other node's symbols forwarded by the relay. This scheme is difficult to extend beyond DMC channels. We also extend the method proposed in [16] [17] [18] to the DMC one-way relay system composing of two potential malicious relays. Since all observations of the destination are prone to be attacked [19] , this network setup only provides unsecured SI for the destination. This work indicates that due to the lack of secured SI, we cannot properly protect communication parties against arbitrary attacks.
In this paper, we consider attack detection problem for the wireless typical three-node network, which performing one-way relaying protocol. The goal of this paper is to make communication parties probabilistically detect arbitrary attacks, despite of i.i.d or non-i.i.d attacks, without using any AMD code or secret transmission. To that end, we facilitate attack detection by utilizing the openness of wireless medium to make the destination obtain secured SI, i.e., the signals directly hearred from the source, etc. On the other hand, due to properties of wireless medium again, all observed signals are continuous, the possible attacks are also continuous in the sense that they are likely to be conducted within continuous alphabet. Our previous work focusing on DMCs [16] [17] [18] [19] are not applicable. This paper proves the detectability of continuous attacks is equivalent to the non-manipulability of wireless channels, also proves the non-manipulability of general wireless channels. The main contribution of this paper is detailed as follows.
1)
We prove that under a non-manipulable condition of wireless channel, all Byzantine attacks, despite of i.i.d or non-i.i.d, are asymptotically detectable by simply using secured SI to statistically check the observations from the relay. The proposed scheme does not use any AMD code or secret transmission, while achieving asymptotically errorless performance.
2) We prove that the non-manipulable channel condition is satisfied as long as the SI and observation are both non-zero and statistic dependent with each other. It is not essential restrict for the general wireless channel. It further indicates the system does not need much power burden to generate the secured SI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL

A. Notation
Let A be an 2-dimensional M ×N matrix. For i = 1, 2, . . . , M and j = 1, 2, . . . , N , [A] i,j denotes the (i, j)th entry of A.
Let B be an 3-dimensional M ×N ×K matrix. For i = 1, 2, . . . , M , j = 1, 2, . . . , N , and k = 1, 2, . . . , K, [B] i,j,k denotes the (i, j, k)th entry of B. Whenever there is no ambiguity, we will employ the notation with no brackets for simplicity. The identity and zero matrices of any dimension are denoted by the generic symbols I and 0, respectively.
For continuous random variables, we use upper-case letters and lower-case letters to denote the random variable itself and a variable of its probability density function (PDF). For instance, suppose U and V are random variables defined over
For each random variable, may be continuous or discrete, there is a corresponding discrete random variable generated by quantifying the random variable. Let use the quantization of U as an example as follows. Suppose one n ′ -length sequence u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n ′ . Then, for j = 1, . . . , n ′ , B ( u j ) denotes the domain consisting of u j . They satisfy the constraints as follows.
where α 1 and β 1 are assumed to depend on n ′ , and lim n ′ →∞ β1−α1 n ′ −2 = 0. Based on the definition of B ( u j ), the continuous variable U can be quantized to discrete U . In particular, if U ∈ B ( u j ), then U = u j . In other words, U
In this paper, U is referred as quantized version of U . (α 1 , β 1 , n ′ ) is referred as quantization parameter. We also term abovementioned quantization of U as that U is quantified according to (α 1 , β 1 , n ′ ). These notations could be applied to other (continuous) random variables and their corresponding quantized versions. For instance, (continuous) variable V is quantized to discrete variable V . Generally, for the discrete random variables, we use upper-case script letters and serif-font letters to denote the corresponding discrete alphabets and elements in the alphabets, respectively. Let use U as an example. As stated above, U is defined over a alphabet U = { u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n ′ }. We employ | U | to denote the cardinality of U . u denotes a generic element in U.
For a pair of random variables U and V , we use P U ( u) and P U| V ( u| v) to denote the marginal distribution of U and the conditional distribution of U given V , respectively.
We also employ U n to denote a sequence of n random variables defined over U, and U i to denote the ith random variable in U n . The counting function N ( u| U n ) records the number of occurrences of the element u in the sequence U n . The indicator function 1 i ( u| U n ) tells whether U i is u. We may also use 1 i ( u) instead of 1 i ( u| U n ) for simplicity, whenever the meaning is clear from the context. It is clear that N ( u| U n ) = n i=1 1 i ( u| U n ). We may trivially extend the aforementioned notations to a tuple of symbols drawn from the corresponding alphabets.
B. Channel Model
Let us focus on the two-hop one-way relay example, where one source and one destination exchange information via a relay system. The communication takes place in two stages. Each stage includes n instants. In the first n instants, the source sends n-length sequence S n to the relay node, S is a discrete random variable. Correspondingly, the relay observe n-length sequence U n . Without loss of generalization, we assume that S is equiprobability binary symbol generated from alphabet (+1, −1) The channel from the source to the relay is specified by U = h 1 S + N r , where U is the received signal of the relay in each instant, h 1 is the constant channel coefficient, and N r is AWGN existed in the channel. N r is random variables following standard Gaussian distribution. Then, the pdf of U conditioned on S = s is given as
Meanwhile, due to the open nature of wireless scenario, the destination could hear sequence X n from the direct channel.
The direct channel is specified by X = h 3 S + N d , where h 3 is the constant coefficient of the direct channel, and N d is standard AWGN existed in the direct channel.
Based on (1) and (2), the PDF of U conditioned on X is given by
where f U|S (u |s i ) is given by (1), and P S|X (
Secondly, in the instants n + 1, n + 2, . . . , 2n, the relay forwards sequence V n to the destination. V is the variable denoting the forwarded signal of the relay. Depending on the relay's attack act, the alphabet of V may be discrete or continuous. The channel from the relay to the destination is specified by
standard AWGN existed in the channel. The pdf of Y conditioned on V is given as
We assume the destination knows f U|X (u |x ) and f Y |V (y |v ) for facilitating attack detection. f U|X (u |x ) , f Y |V (y |v ) is referred as to observation channel.
C. Attack Model
The potential malicious relay receives sequence U n , and then forwards sequence V n . The relay may perform arbitrary attacks, including i.i.d. and non-i.i.d. attacks, while the parameter of attack is unknown to the destination. Thus, V n may be a non-i.i.d. sequence, and distribution of U n and V n , i.e., f V n ,U n (v n , u n ), is also unknown to the destination. This property motivates us to develop a non-parameter method to model the attacks.
For modeling the attack, we first notice the sequence U n is continuous. The alphabet of V is not definite, it is possible to be any arbitrary value in (−∞, +∞). We quantize U and V according to quantized parameters (α 1 , β 1 , n ′ ) and (α 2 , β 2 , n v )
where α 2 , β 2 , where n v depend on n ′ , and then get quantized variables U and V , respectively.
Based on the quantization, the function △F
If the relay is absolutely reliable, we must always have nv
From this intuitively understanding, the malicious relay is defined as follows.
Definition 1. (Malicious Relay) The relay is said to be non-malicious if
probability as n and n ′ approach to infinity. Otherwise, the relay is considered malicious.
Note that Definition 1 tolerates manipulating only a negligible fraction of symbols by the relays. This relaxation has essentially no effect on the information rate from the source to the destination across the relays. Definition 1 also tolerates modification conducted by the relay within a negligible extent. This negligible extent is specified by β2−α2 nv−2 , as β2−α2 nv−2 → 0, this modification has essentially no effect on the information reliability from the source to the destination across the relay.
The destination is free to use Y n and X n to detect the existence of malicious relay. We will propose the detection method, and prove that as n → ∞, the error probability of the proposed detection method approaches to 0.
III. MAIN RESULTS
For easy description of our main result, we first define the non-manipulable relay channel.
Definition 2. Non-manipulable AWGN Relay Channel
The observation channel
if there exists function Ψ (v |u ) that satisfies the following three conditions
2) For arbitrary value of u,
The following theorem will show the non-manipulability of relay network is equivalent to the detectability of maliciousness.
Theorem 1. (Maliciousness detectability of wireless relay network)
The
is non-manipulable is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a sequence of decision statistics {D n } simultaneously having the following two properties:
Fix any sufficiently small δ > 0, ǫ > 0, there has sufficiently large n ′ ,
is strictly positive and can be arbitrary small.
The properties 1) and 2) of Theorem 1 together imply that we have D n → 0 in probability if the relay network is safe. To We will show almost all the relay networks are non-manipulable as follows.
Proposition 1. (Non-manipulability of AWGN Relay Channel)
If and only if h 1 = 0, h 2 = 0 and h 3 = 0, the observation
Obviously, the Proposition 1 indicates the non-manipulability is very common for the general networks. Jointly considering Theorem 1 and Proposition 1, we attain that almost all the relay networks can detect arbitrary attack by using physical-layer observation. Furthermore, according to Proposition 1, even the power of X n is very little yet nonzero, the observation channel is still non-manipulable. It indicates the direct channel exists yet suffers deep fading, the signal observed from the direct channel still can be used for attack detection and achieving asymptotically errorless performance.
Remark 1. We utilize the signals delivered by direct channel, i.e., X n , to detect attacks. X n are guaranteed not to be attacked and is statistically correlated to Y n . Thus, X n could work as secured SI to check whether Y n is attacked by the relay. If the direct channel is unavailable, the destination can send artificial noise with a little power to the relay, and use the artificial noise as secured SI. The detectability of this scheme could also be proved following the similar procedures given in this paper. It is worth noting that our previous work also considered two-hop one-way relay network [19] . In that work, destination does not have secured SI, all observations are prone to be attacked. As a result, the destination cannot handle all possible attacks: the permutation attacks are able to always fool the destination, despite of in manipulable channel or in non-manipulable channel.
By contrast, the proposed work of this paper, utilizing wireless medium to get secured SI, can handle all possible attacks. The performance improvement is brought by employment of secured SI, X n .
Remark 2. The reference [16] [17] [18] also utilizes self-information of each node as clean reference, which is similar to our proposed work. However, the work proposed by [16] [17] [18] is tailored for DMC, which cannot be extended straightforwardly in AWGN channel. Unlike [16] [17] [18] , this paper investigates the detectability problem for AWGN channel, and we find most of all AWGN relay network are able to detect attacks by using physical-layer observations.
IV. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Lemma 1. If h 1 = 0 and h 3 = 0, there does not exist any i.i.d attack making the statistical distribution of U conditioned on X is equivalent to the statistical distribution of V conditioned on X.
Proof: Let us assume the manipulable wireless channel exists, which indicates there at least one i.i.d attack making the statistical distribution of U conditioned on X is equivalent to the statistical distribution of V conditioned on X. Hence, we have I (X; U ) = I (X; V ), where I (·; ·) denotes mutual information between the two input variables. On the other hand, (X, U, V ) forms a Markov chain as X → U → V . From Data-Processing Inequality, I (X; U ) = I (X; V ) implies the Markov chain X → V → U is also established. Then, we have
where a and b denote arbitrary value of X, a = b. Furthermore, Pr (U = u |V = v, X = a ) can be extended as
where the second equation follows the fact that X → U → V also forms a Markov chain. Similarly,
can be extended as
where the second equation is again relying on the fact that X → U → V forms a Markov chain. Substituting (8) and (9) into (7), we have
Notice that (10) should be always established for arbitrary value of a and b. Thus, we have
which could be further reshaped as
Without loss of generality, we assume h 3 > 0. Then, according to the expression of f U|X (u |x ), (12) becomes
which indicates
Obviously, as h 1 = 0, if and only if Pr (V = v |U = u ) = 0 for u = v, (14) would be true. Then, for any attacks that (14) would not be true, which contradicts to the assumption that there at least one i.i.d attack making the statistical distribution of U conditioned on X 1 is equivalent to the statistical distribution of V conditioned on X 1 . Hence, the lemma is proved.
Lemma 2. For random variables
Proof: According to the fact that Z 3 = Z 1 + Z 2 , where Z 1 and Z 2 are stochastic independent with each other, then the characteristic function of Z 3 conditioned on X 1 = x is expressed by
where ϕ Z3| X (t | x ), ϕ Z1| X (t | x ) and ϕ Z2| X (t | x ) denote the characteristic functions of Z 3 , Z 2 and Z 1 conditioned on X 1 = x, respectively. Similarly, according to the fact that Z 5 = Z 4 + Z 2 , where Z 4 and Z 2 are stochastic independent with each other, then the characteristic function of Z 5 conditioned on X 1 = x is expressed by
where ϕ Z5| X (t | x ) and ϕ Z4| X (t | x ) denote the characteristic functions of Z 4 and Z 2 conditioned on X 1 = x, respectively.
Substituting (15) and (16) into (15), we get
Since ϕ Z 2| X (t | x )is characteristic function which always attains strictly non-zero value across t ∈ (−∞, +∞), then we have
From the knowledge that pdf can be uniquely determined by characteristic function, (19) indicates
Let us back to the proof of Proposition 
We finally get that if and only if U = V ,
Hence, the proposition 1 is proved.
V. PROOF OF THEOREM 1: PREPARATIONS
For easy description of our proof, we first define some functions and values as follows.
, N x X n = 0, 0, otherwise
For k = 1, 2, . . . , n v , v k denotes generic value belonging to B ( v k ).
In order to prove one convergence property given later, we also define
where i = i ′ , j, j ′ = 1, 2, . . . n ′ , i, i ′ = 1, 2, . . . n. Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3. If we choose α 1 = −β 1 , and β 1 = √ n ′ , then upon this setup, there also exist a upper bound for F i,i ′ j,j ′ across j, j ′ = 2, . . . n ′ − 1, i, i ′ = 1, 2, 3, . . . n, i = i ′ . This upper bound only depends on n ′ rather than n. Hence, we denote the upper bound as △F max (n ′ ). △F max (n ′ ) has property that
where k is strictly less than 1 2 , i.e., k < 1 2 .
Proof: To bound △F i,i ′ j,j ′ , we have
On the other hand, since
and
Jointly considering (26), (27) and (28), △F i,i ′ ,j,j ′ could be bound as
Then, we have
Then, we proceed to focus on the property of F max (n ′ ). Revisiting the system model, for j = 2, 3, . . . , n ′ − 1, we have
where the last equality follows the fact that the maximum of P ′ X|U x u ′ j and P X|U x u ′ j in (−∞, +∞) is bounded, and k is strictly less than 1/2. Finally, based on the definition of F max (n ′ ) in (29), the statement of this lemma is immediate.
Similar to the definition of △F i,i ′ ,j,j ′ and Lemma 3, we define
where i = i ′ , k, k ′ = 2, 3, . . . n v − 1, i, i ′ = 1, 2, . . . n. Then, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4. If we choose α 2 = −β 2 , and β 2 = √ n v , then upon this setup, there also exist a upper bound for G i,i ′ ,k,k ′ across
This upper bound only depends on n v rather than n v . Hence, we denote the upper bound as △G max (n v ). △G max (n v ) has property that
where k is strictly less than 1 2 , i.e., τ < 1 2 .
Proof: Following the proof method employed by Lemma 3, the assertion is direct. More details are omitted due to space limitation.
Lemma 5. For arbitrary v k , sufficiently small µ and ε ≤ µ 2n ′ ,
Proof: Notice that
Firstly notice that after n ′ , α 1 and β 1 are chosen and fixed properly,
as n approaches to infinity. Then, focusing on the first item in the right side of (36), X n , U n ∈ A ε indicates N u j U n > 0 for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n ′ . Hence,
is well-defined for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n ′ . Under the condition X n , U n ∈ Aε, we have
Substituting (38) into the first item in the right side of (36), it becomes
The second item in the right of (39) can be further bound as
where the last equality follows the definition of A ε and set of ε ≤ µ 2n ′ . From (40), the second item in the right of (39) equals to 0. Then, we proceed to bound the first item in the right of (39) as
which follows the Chebyshev theorem. E Aε (·) indicates the expectation of its input conditioned on X n , U n ∈ A ε .
From (43) (40) (39) and (36), we have
The proof is finished.
Upon the aforementioned lemmas, the following assertion convergence property can be proved. Lemma 6. For arbitrary t, sufficiently small µ and ε ≤ µ 4n ′ nv ,
According to Lemma 5, the second item in the right side of (46) can be bound as
Then, we just need to focus on the first item in the right side of (46). Following the similar steps employed in the proof of (5), we have
where Pr X n / ∈ T n [ X] ε → 0 as n approaches to infinity. Then, we focus on bounding the first item in the right side of (48).
Following the Chebyshev theorem, we attain
Substituting (50) into (49), we get
From (51), (46), (47), and (48), we finally obtain
Upon the convergence property, the following lemma is immediate.
Lemma 7. For sequence t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t ny−1 , upon setup that β 3 = −α 3 = √ n y , n 2 y = √ n v , and n 2 v = √ n ′ , we have 1) Fix µ to arbitrary small value, there has
2) Fix n ′ to arbitrary large value, and ǫ to arbitrary small value, there has
where n approaches to infinity, lim n ′ →∞ µ n ′ = 0.
Proof: For arbitrary small µ, we have
where the last inequality follows Lemma 6. Upon the setup that β 3 = −α 3 = √ n y , n 2 y = √ n v , and n 2 v = √ n ′ , we have
With these results, the upper bound of (54) approaches to 0, as n ′ → ∞, n → ∞. Hence, the first assertion is proved. Furthermore, again relying on (54), let us set
As ǫ is fixed, and n approaches to infinity, it is readily available to get lim n ′ →∞ µ n ′ = 0. The second statement can be proved.
VI. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let us go back to the proof of theorem 1. With the aforementioned lemmas, we will show the decision statistic D n = Upon n ′ , we define function
i,j,k , i = 1, 2, . . . , n ′ , j = 1, 2, . . . , n v , k = 1, 2, . . . , n x and
, M (n ′ ) W (n ′ ) = 0 has one solution in the point that W (n ′ ) 0 defined as
i,j,k = 1, j = 1, 2, . . . n v , i = 1, . . . n ′ , k = 1, 2, . . . , n x . We also define D
is denoted as λ (n ′ ) (δ).
Proof: Using the observation that M (n ′ ) W (n ′ ) is a convex function, the proof of this lemma follows our previous work.
Lemma 9.
If the wireless channel is non-manipulable, then for arbitrary small δ, there exist sufficient large n 0 , such that for
Proof: Notice that for arbitrary W
Then, according to the condition that
For the sake of proof, we define a function set
Then, we define D
Then, we get
On the other hand, from the definition of F and the condition that the wireless channel is non-manipulable, we get
which indicates there is no division manner for t ∈ (−∞, +∞) making (65) be true. It contradicts with the meaning of (65). We proceed to examine another case that if +∞
cannot be integrated, since +∞ Lemma 10. Fixing arbitrary small ǫ and δ, if there exist n ′ 0 such that
> δ} > 0 then, we have for n ′ > n ′ 0 , Pr {D n < ε (n ′ , δ) |R (U n , V n , n ′ ) > δ } is well-defined and Pr {D n < ε (n ′ , δ) |R (U n , V n , n ′ ) > δ } ≤ ǫ where n → ∞, n ′ is sufficient large so as to satisfy the properties given by lemma 4 and lemma 6. ε (n ′ , δ) is strictly positive and can be arbitrary small value.
Proof: According to lemma 7, there exist µ n ′ such that
where µ n ′ → 0 as n ′ → ∞, n → ∞. The last inequality follows the fact that R (U n , V n , n ′ 0 ) > δ implies R (U n , V n , n ′ ) > δ according to the definition of △F
Upon (75), (76) and (77), we have Pr D n ≥ ε n ′ , δ , R U n , V n , n ′ ≥ δ ≥ Pr D n ≥ ε n ′ , δ , R U n , V n , n ′ ≥ δ, G V n , U n , X n ≤ µ ′ = Pr R U n , V n , n ′ ≥ δ, G V n , U n , X n ≤ µ n ′ ≥ Pr R U n , V n , n ′ ≥ δ − Pr G V n , U n , X n ≥ µ n ′ where the equation follows the logic from (75), (76) to (77). Then, we have Pr D n ≥ ε n ′ , δ R U n , V n , n ′ ≥ δ = Pr {D n ≥ ε (n ′ , δ) , R (U n , V n , n ′ ) ≥ δ} Pr {R (U n , V n , n ′ ) ≥ δ} > 1 − Pr G V n , U n , X n ≥ µ n ′ Pr {R (U n , V n , n ′ ) ≥ δ}
where the last inequality follows (74). The proof is finished.
The first property of theorem 1 is direct result from lemma 10.
We proceed to prove the second property of theorem 1. For arbitrary small δ, µ and µ ′ (n ′ , δ) = µ + nx−1 nx−2 nz−1 nz−2 δ, we have
where the equality firstly follows the fact that
F Zr |V (t m |v m,j,k ) < µ + n x − 1 n x − 2 n z − 1 n z − 2 δ = µ ′ (n ′ , δ).
Hence, the equality in (79) is established. Upon (79) and lemma 3, the property 2 in Theorem 1 is direct.
